Abstract: Local authorities in North Carolina, and subsequently in at least 23 other states, have enacted laws intending to reduce predatory and abusive lending. While there is substantial variation in the laws, they typically extend the coverage of the Federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) by including home purchase and open-end mortgage credit, by lowering annual percentage rate (APR) and fees and points triggers, and by prohibiting or restricting the use of balloon payments and prepayment penalties. This paper provides a detailed summary of various local predatory lending laws that are effective as of the end of 2004. We also create an index that captures differences in the strength of the local laws along the two important dimensions of coverage and restrictions. In addition, our univariate results show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the observed market responses to the local laws.
Introduction
The current mortgage market consists primarily of two segments -the prime market and the subprime market. The prime market extends credit to the majority of households. The subprime market extends more expensive credit to households who are less financially secure.
Subprime mortgage lending tends to occur in low-income areas and those with minority populations. The subprime market identifies a large menu of product and risk classifications.
Each classification charges a different risk-based price (interest rate and fees) that are substantially higher than those charged in the prime market, typically varying from one to four percentage points above the prime mortgage interest rate. As a result, those households for whom homeownership is most difficult incur higher costs. This combination of higher costs and higher rates of failure has led to public policy concerns over fairness and accessibility of credit.
As reflected in regulations generated under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), Congress has determined that it is socially preferable to restrict some types of high-cost and high risk lending. In addition, many states, cities, and counties have extended the restrictions on credit to an even broader class of mortgages. These restrictions include limits on allowable prepayment penalties and balloon payments, prohibitions of joint financing of various insurance products (credit, life, unemployment, etc) , and requirements that borrowers participate in loan counseling.
By introducing geographically defined predatory lending laws policymakers have conducted a natural experiment with well defined control and treatment groups. Since state boundaries reflect political and not economic regions, we can compare mortgage market conditions in states with a law in effect 1 (the treatment group) to those in neighboring states currently without a predatory lending law (the control group). However, instead of examining whole states we focus on households that are geographically close to each other (border counties) and in similar labor markets (multi-state metropolitan and micropolitan areas). Specifically, using the treatment and control group framework we examine how local predatory lending laws affect subprime applications, originations, and rejection rates.
In addition, we create an index to measure the strength of the local predatory lending laws.
The index measures: (i) how broad or narrow coverage the mortgage market is covered and
(ii) how much certain lending practices and mortgage types are restricted.
Since predatory lending has been associated primarily with subprime lending, the next section will discuss the growth of subprime lending and help to distinguish it from prime lending. In addition, a range of predatory lending laws will be described including HOEPA and local (state, county, and city) laws that were in effect at the end of 2004.
The Growth of Subprime Lending
Subprime lending represents an opportunity for the mortgage market to extend the possibility of home ownership beyond traditional barriers. These barriers exist because the prime segment of the mortgage market uses lending standards (credit scores and documented employment history, income, and wealth, among other factors) to evaluate applicants.
Applicants that are rejected or expect to be rejected can look to the more expensive subprime market. In this fashion the subprime market completes the mortgage market and can be welfare enhancing (Chinloy and MacDonald, 2005) because it provides the opportunity of home ownership to a larger portion of the population.
Despite only anecdotal evidence, predatory lending has been predominantly associated with subprime lending and not prime lending 2 . Therefore, the welfare benefit associated with increased access to credit is believed to have been reduced by some unscrupulous lending in the subprime mortgage market. Table 1 shows the substantial growth of the subprime market that has set the stage for Another facet of the subprime market, beyond its recent growth, is that these mortgages cost more than prime mortgages. Table 2 shows the average interest charged at origination for fixed-rate loans in the prime and subprime markets. The interest rate shown does not include any estimated fees and points paid or other upfront costs wrapped into the mortgage.
However, the price differential is substantial. For example, the spread between prime and subprime was on average as high as 2.98 percentage points in 2000.
To justify such high interest rates for subprime borrowers, lenders must experience much larger rates of termination --particularly foreclosures --than in the prime market. Figure 1 provides evidence using data from the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBAA) that subprime loans do in fact experience substantially higher rates of foreclosures than both prime mortgages and loans endorsed by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA). The figure also provides at least indirect evidence that subprime loans did not perform very well during the recession beginning in March 2001. In contrast, FHA loans were only moderately affected and prime loans seemed almost completely unaffected by the recession. For example, at their peak less than one percent of prime loans were in foreclosure, compared to more than nine percent for subprime loans.
If these MBAA data are representative of the subprime market, then low income and high minority locations, where subprime lending is most dominant, could have almost one out of ten homes in foreclosure during a recession. This type of performance can help to justify the higher rates on subprime loans. 4 However, such a high level of failure also raises questions about what effect the foreclosures have on the other nine homes in locations heavily financed by subprime mortgages. 
Understanding Predatory Lending
In any document discussing predatory lending one of the first statements is usually similar to that found in the HUD-Treasury report (2000, p.17) : "Defining the practices that make a loan predatory, however, is problematic." This difficulty arises because predatory lending depends on the inability of the borrower to understand the loan terms and the obligations associated with them. For example, some borrowers may be willing to accept a prepayment penalty in exchange for lower interest rates or fees because they do not expect to move in the near future. Or, the borrower may plan to diversify her portfolio away from a home and therefore would like an interest-only loan with a balloon payment in ten years. But interviews held by HUD, Treasury, and the Federal Reserve Board indicate that some, perhaps many, borrowers using high-cost loans may not have understood that the loan had a prepayment penalty or did not amortize through time, leading to a balloon payment.
The fact that some borrowers lack this information or knowledge for such a significant debt may be hard to comprehend at first blush. However, when a borrower buys a home or refinances a mortgage, a large and intimidating stack of documents is placed in front of her with little time to read, let alone digest, all of the text. If borrowers actually read all the documents required by law at the time of closing it would take all day. Moreover, many of the documents are written in a manner that is difficult for non-lawyers to understand. For all practical purposes, the seller, buyer, and/or refinancer rely on the representations and interpretations of closing agents.
Thus, it may be unreasonable to expect borrowers to actually read all the documents that define their rights and obligations. This makes it possible for unscrupulous agents to take advantage of that information gap. Such abuses are more likely when the borrower is perceived as vulnerable because of age, economic circumstances, education, or disability.
HUD-Treasury Report
HUD and Treasury published an influential report in 2000 entitled "Curbing Predatory Home
Mortgage Lending". The joint report provides policy suggestions for Congress, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Housing Authority on how to curb predatory lending.
HUD and Treasury created a task force to solicit information from industry and community representatives in five locations (Atlanta, Los Angeles, New York, Baltimore, and Chicago).
The task force itself included representatives from consumer groups, industry trade associations representing lenders, brokers, and appraisers, local officials, and academics. The outreach effort provided substantial evidence through individual testimony that predatory lending does exist in the mortgage market and tends to be concentrated in the subprime market segment. The HUD-Treasury report defines predatory lending as that involving deception or fraud and aggressive sales tactics, which takes advantage of the borrower's lack of understanding of basic rights and the terms of the mortgage. The report also concluded that predatory lending tends to occur more frequently in the refinancing of existing mortgages than in home purchase loans and more frequently in locations with low income and minority households.
Categories of Predatory Lending
Lending abuses or predatory practices can be categorized into four groups: loan flipping, imposition of excessive fees and "packing", lending without regard for ability to repay, and fraud. equity left in the home. In some instances, the report found evidence that fees exceeded $5,000 or as much as ten percent of the loan amount.
Fees were found to be very large at times. Typically fees were added to the financed amount (wrapped) instead of being paid upfront. Perhaps most importantly, the consumers often were not aware of the fees, which could be charged by many different sources, including the mortgage broker, home improvement contractor, lender, or other third parties. In addition to normal closing fees 6 , some of the borrowers were sold single-premium credit life insurance, which was included in the loan amount and not used in the calculation of the APR.
The task force found evidence that some loans were originated under terms that the borrower would never be able to meet. This problem was exacerbated when the lender did not try to verify income, which may have been falsified by a broker. Examples were found of elderly households on fixed incomes where the new mortgage payment exceeded their income. Once the borrower failed to make payments, the lender foreclosed on the property. Clearly, this practice is profitable only when the amount of equity in the home exceeds the cost of foreclosure and the borrower does not exercise the option to sell the home and prepay the mortgage before foreclosure.
Other examples of predatory behavior included fraudulent inflation of property values through doctored loan applications and settlement documents as well as appraisers and brokers conspiring to inflate prices above market rates.
Based on these findings, the report recommended improved consumer literacy and disclosures, as well as prohibitions on loan flipping, lending without regard to ability to repay, and the sale of life credit insurance and other similar products. The task force also recommended that potentially abusive terms and conditions such as balloon payments, prepayment penalties, excessive fees and points be restricted. A creditor offering a HOEPA-covered loan was required to provide the consumer a shortened disclosure statement at least three days before the closing date. The creditor was also required to inform the consumer that they were not obligated to complete the transaction and that they could lose the home if they failed to make the mortgage payments.
National Restrictions -Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
For HOEPA-covered loans, creditors were not allowed to provide short-term balloon notes, impose prepayment penalties greater than five years, use non-amortizing schedules, refinance loans into another HOEPA loan in the first 12 months, and impose higher interest rate upon default. These restrictions implied that regulators considered these loan types and practices to be abusive lending practices when combined with high-cost loans. In addition, creditors were not allowed to habitually engage in lending that did not take into account the ability of the consumer to repay the loan. Again, this restriction implied that regulators believed such a pattern of lending, based strictly on the value of the property (or asset-based lending) is not conducive to homeownership and inconsistent with public policy promoting homeownership.
Changes in Triggers, Disclosures, and Restrictions
Since 1994, subprime lending has grown very rapidly and has led to concerns that predatory lending was occurring even while complying with the requirements set forth in Regulation Z. from the HOEPA eight percent of total loan amount to five percent for loans under $20,000.
For loans $20,000 or larger, the same eight percent trigger is used or $1,000, whichever is smaller. The North Carolina law also prohibits prepayment penalties and balloon payments for most covered loans. But the law also prohibits the financing of credit life, disability, unemployment, or other life and insurance premiums, while HOEPA included them only as part of the trigger calculation.
Appendix A shows that while most states followed the North Carolina example there is some variation in laws. For example, Georgia passed a law that became effective in October 2002
(amended in March 2003) that also includes open-end credit but sets slightly different APR trigger levels to define high-cost loans and covered loans. The points and fees triggers then differ depending on whether the loan is categorized as high-cost or simply covered.
Prepayment penalties are also prohibited during the first 12 months of the loan if they exceed two percent of the value of the loan or during the second 12 months they exceed one percent.
In this case, Georgia prepayment safeguards are weaker than North Carolina's.
In an attempt to quantify the differences in the local laws an index is created. The higher the index the stronger the law is. In addition, the index can be broken down into two components. The first is the extent that the law has extended coverage of the law beyond the HOEPA. The second is the extent that the law restricts or requires specific practices. Table 3 summarizes how the law index is created. The full index reflects all the assigned points as defined in Table 3 , while the coverage and restrictions indexes reflect the sum of all points assigned in each subcategory.
The coverage category includes measures of loan purpose, APR 1 st lien, APR higher liens, and points and fees. In general, if the law does not increase the coverage it is assigned zero points. Higher points are assigned if the coverage is more general. The highest point total for extending the loan purpose coverage is when the law covers all loans. The points assigned for extending the APR triggers is defined as the difference between the HOEPA trigger and the laws trigger. In addition, laws with no APR triggers are assigned the maximum observed difference plus one. The point and fees trigger points also follow a similar approach. Laws that extend HOEPA in any way are assigned one point, other laws are assigned the difference between the HOEPA percent points and fees trigger and the minimum trigger used in the law minus one. Laws with no points and fees triggers are assigned four points.
The restrictions index includes measures of prepayment penalty restrictions, balloon restrictions, counseling requirements, and restrictions on mandatory arbitration. If the law does not require any restriction or requirement then zero points are assigned. Higher points indicate more restrictions. For example, laws that do not restrict prepayment penalties are assigned zero points, while laws that prohibit all prepayment penalties are assigned four points. Laws that prohibit or restrict the points more quickly are assigned higher points. For balloon restriction, the points vary from zero for no restrictions to four when the law prohibits all balloons. 9 The last two restrictions measure whether the law requires counseling before the loan is originated or restricts fully or partially mandatory arbitration clauses. 
Prepayment Penalty Prohibitions
No restriction=0, prohibition or percent limits after 60 months=1, prohibition or percent limits after 36 months=2, prohibition or percent limits after 24 months=3, and no penalties allowed=4
Balloon Prohibitions
No restriction =0, no balloon if term<7 years (all term restrictions) =1, no balloon in first 10 years of mortgage =2, no balloon in first 10 years of mortgage and Cleveland=3, and no balloons allowed=4
Counseling Requirements Not required=0, and Required=1
Mandatory Arbitration Limiting Judicial Relief Allowed=0, partially restricted=1, and prohibited =2
The law index is calculated by summing all categories. The coverage and restrictions indexes are created by summing the subcategories. The Coverage and Restrictions Indexes are modestly correlated (0.19).
Some Potential Impacts of the Restrictions
HOEPA and the state and local laws are designed to eliminate certain classes of loans from being originated. These prohibitions implicitly assume that the terms of these loans are inherently abusive or that the fraction of loans that are abusive is so high that the social benefit of avoiding the abusive loans outweighs the social cost of restricting access to credit by high-risk applicants. This section discusses some of the laws' potential impacts. Some examples include: (i) whether the laws influence the supply of credit in general, (ii) whether the laws impact the prevalence of specific types of loans targeted by the laws, (iii) whether a reaction occurs in the market by substituting different uncovered loans for covered loans as opposed to reducing the supply of credit, (iv) whether the secondary market reacts by reducing liquidity, and (v) whether regulatory costs (the cost of complying with the local predatory lending laws) are passed on to consumers through higher interest rates. The following section reviews the to-date evidence on the impact of predatory lending laws.
Supply of Credit
Unfortunately, no research to date (to our knowledge) has measured the costs and benefits to society of HOEPA and the state and local predatory lending laws. Instead, researchers are able to measure how the volume of loans has reacted to the introduction of the law. This analysis helps to answer the first question: Do predatory lending laws reduce the supply of credit? There is substantial evidence that the North Carolina predatory lending law is binding (Ernst, Farris, and Stein 2002; Quercia, Stegman, and Davis 2003; Harvey and Nigro 2004; and Elliehausen and Staten 2004) and some initial evidence that the laws passed in Chicago and Philadelphia also had an impact (Harvey and Nigro 2003) .
The primary finding of the research to date is that the volume of subprime loans did decrease in North Carolina. The impact seems to be larger for low-income borrowers and minority borrowers. There is also some evidence that the decline in volume came from reduced applications --not increases in rejection rates. Given that predatory lending laws have spread to many other localities it remains to be seen whether this result continues to hold.
Targeted Loan Types
A second question is to determine whether there is evidence that the types of loans targeted by these laws, or loan-related characteristics such as balloon payments and prepayment penalties, are affected when the law becomes effective. Quercia, Stegman, and Davis (2003) show that balloon payment loans and prepayment penalties tended to become a smaller portion of the market after the law in North Carolina was introduced.
Substitution
The finding that the predatory lending law in North Carolina resulted in fewer subprime loans and fewer of the targeted loan types suggests that lenders are not able to find perfect substitutes for the prohibited loan types. For example, if the prohibited loans were predatory because they charged excessive fees and interest rates, one response of predatory lenders to the laws would be to simply charge lower fees and interest rates. In essence, the lenders would become less predatory. On the other hand, if the market is perfectly competitive then the laws should simply restrict the flow of credit.
10
In perfect risk-based pricing, each borrower is charged a unique price associated with their estimated risk profile. In a perfectly competitive market, each loan is priced at the break-even rate. Therefore, lenders cannot reduce the price charged to the high-risk borrowers because the loan would lose money. As a result, loans with risk characteristics that require a breakeven price above the legal limit will no longer be originated. This outcome is consistent with the findings in North Carolina that the volume of loans decreased when the law became effective.
By contrast, if lenders operate in an environment where perfect competition is not achievedsuch as a case in which the borrower does not understand the terms of the loan --the price charged to the consumer for these loans could be higher than the cost. In these circumstances, it is possible for lenders to charge above the break-even price and impose abusive or 10 Another option is that the reduced flow of credit in the subprime market is matched by an increased flow of credit in the prime market; that is, prime loans are being substituted for subprime loans. Research in North Carolina has found no evidence of this type of substitution (Ernst, Farris, and Stein 2002 , Quercia, Stegman, and Davis 2003 , Harvey and Nigro 2004 , and Elliehausen and Staten 2004 ).
predatory lending rates. As a result, lenders will be able to reduce the price and still break even on at least some of the prohibited loans. This would be the simplest form of substitution available to lenders in response to legal restrictions and would be consistent with the notion that abusive and predatory lending has been occurring.
Other forms of substitution are also possible. Lenders may also try to move potential borrowers away from covered loans and toward other types of loans with similar payment characteristics that are not covered by the law. For example, the laws do not distinguish between adjustable rate and fixed rate loans. Adjustable rate loans typically have lower interest rates at origination than fixed rate loans, but over time the interest rate will adjust to a fixed spread above predetermined interest rate instruments such as LIBOR or Treasury bill rates. Therefore, lenders could be expected to shift some borrowers away from fixed rate loans and into adjustable rate loans to avoid violating the predatory laws or having the loan covered by the law. Such substitution from one product type to another does not necessarily mean abusive loans are being made, because it can also be consistent with break-even pricing.
Liquidity
The regulations may make it more difficult to sell loans in the secondary market. For example, the loss severity number for Georgia is 110 percent: This is the estimate of the total possible damages required to extinguish the liability under the loan, assuming a nine percent coupon rate on a 30-year loan of 100,000 dollars, including attorney fees and costs, which are assumed to be ten percent of the unpaid balance. In each state we examine the change in originations for subprime loans under the prescribed loan limits in the year before the predatory lending law is introduced and the year after the law is introduced using the publicly available Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data. 12 Growth rates are calculated for loans associated with a list of subprime lenders as identified by the HUD subprime lender list. 13 In an attempt to create as similar comparison groups as possible, only counties that border other states without a local predatory lending law are used for the treatment group. The control group only includes counties in neighboring states that border the treatment state and do not have a predatory lending law in effect during the observed time period (the year before and after the introduction of the predatory lending law). This contrasts with other studies (Harvey and Nigro 2004; Elliehausen and Staten 2004) that have used whole neighboring states or regions to define both control and treatment groups. Our approach should help to increase the comparability of the treatment group and the control group because they are geographically closer and, as a result, likely to be more economically similar than full state and region comparisons.
11 See the Standard and Poor's web site and the May 14, 2004, presentation by Frank Raiter, entitled "Evaluating Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: S&P's Approach". The MBAA also reprints the S&P reports on each local lending law for its association members, available at www.mbaa.org. 12 The results are very similar if the loan limits are not applied to reduce the sample. 13 http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html, accessed on 2/1/05. HUD generates a list of subprime lenders from industry trade publications, HMDA data analysis, and phone calls to the lender confirm the extent of subprime lending. Since this list is defined at the lender level loans made by the subprime lender may include both prime and subprime loans. In addition, subprime loans made by predominately prime lenders will also be incorrectly identified as prime lending. Therefore, an alternative interpretation of the loans identified using the HUD subprime lender list is that it identifies the extent of specialized subprime lending not full-service lending.
This approach and HMDA availability reduces the sample to ten state local predatory lending laws (California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas). The second and third columns examine the relative growth rates in originations for minority and low income applicants. 15 Again, the results are mixed as some locations experienced a relative increase and others a relative decrease in subprime originations. Table 6 examines the relative growth in applications for subprime credit and Table 7 examines the relative change in subprime rejection rates. applications. However the rejection rates tell a much more consistent story. In most states, rejection rates declined more in the treatment locations than in the control locations indicating that the introduction of predatory lending laws was associated with a disproportionate reduction in the rate that subprime application were rejected.
These results do not provide any indication that predatory lending laws systematically reduce the flow of subprime credit. However, the results do show that predatory lending laws tend to be associated with lower rejection rates of subprime mortgage applications. It can be expensive just to apply for a mortgage: the non-refundable application fee usually runs from $200 to $300, not to mention other hidden or non-pecuniary costs. Thus, while reducing rejection rates may not have been the primary purpose of the laws, a reduction in rejections can be a substantial savings to consumers.
Correlation of Impact and Law Indexes
The previous section followed prior literature and estimated the impact of a local lending law one law at a time. While the findings for North Carolina law sample were largely replicated the results showed that other laws did not always have the same impact. In fact, some laws were associated with relative increases in the flow of credit. This section tests to see if the heterogeneity in market responses is related to the nature or strength of the local law. Table 8 presents the correlation between the impact of a local law, measured as the difference in the percent change in the probability of the outcome (applying, originating, or being rejected), and the law indexes described previously. Stronger laws are correlated with relative reductions in application, origination, and rejection rates. However, law coverage is positively correlated with application, origination, and rejection rates and law restrictions are negatively associated with application, origination, and rejection rates and law restrictions.
This provides preliminary evidence that the design of a local predatory lending law can lead to different outcomes in terms of the flow of credit (origination rates), the demand for credit (application rates), and the rejections of subprime applications (rejection rates). North Carolina is examined, (ii) the data design compares loans, and loan applications, that are geographically close instead of whole states and regions, and (iii) indexes are created in an attempt to quantify differences in the strength of the local laws.
Preliminary univariate results provide some evidence that each local predatory lending law impacts the flow of credit in a different way, and that the experience in North Carolina found in literature (reduced application and origination) is not typical. Future research should incorporate some measure of the strength of the laws, such as the indexes created in this paper, into empirical tests to understand the mechanism by which local predatory lending laws affect the subprime market. P&F > 5% of the total loan amount for loans =/> $75,000; or 6% of the total loan amount for loans < $75,000 but > $20,000; or 8% of the total loan amount for loans =/< $20,000 (1) after the 3rd year of the loan; (2) pursuant to a refinance by the same lender; or (3) that is partial. Prepayment fees may not be included in a covered loan UNLESS the lender offers the obligor the option of choosing a loan product without a prepayment fee.
Appendix A: Predatory Lending Laws -Provision Chart
Penalty cannot > 3% of prepaid balance within one year; 2% between one and two years, and 1% between two and three years. Prepayment penalty not allowed if debts >/= 50% of monthly gross income. The payment of the prepayment penalty cannnot be through a refinancing by the lender or its affiliate (no wrapping of fees into the new loan amount).
Prohibits prepayment penalities (1) that apply to a prepayment made after the expiration of 36-month period following the date the loan was made, or (2) that are more than 3% total loan amount (first 12 months) or 2% (second 12 months) or 1% (third 12 month period).
Prepayment penalties are permitted only during the first 36 months after consummation, if (1) the borrower has been offered a choice of another product without a prepayment penalty, and (2) the borrower has been given at least 3 business days prior to consummation a written disclosure with terms and the benefit of accepting a loan with prepayment penalty. No lending without due regard to ability to pay.
Monthly debts should not exceed 50% gross income. Applies to borrowers whose income is no greater than 120% of the Chicago MSA median family income.
No lending without due regard to ability to pay
Balloon payments
No balloons payable less than 120 months or 10 years after consummation.
No balloons for a loan with a term of less than 7 years (does not apply to bridge loans with maturities of less than 1 year, and a loan connected with the acquisition or construction of a dwelling).
No balloons payable less than 180 months after consummation.
Balloon payments for a loan with a term of less than 10 years prohibited. Covered loan: P&F>3% of total loan amount. HCL: P&F > 5% of the total loan amount for loans =/> $20,000, or the lesser of 8% of the total loan amount or $1,000 for loans <$20,000) (up to two bona fide discount points may be excluded).
P&F > the greater of 5% of the total loan amount or $800 (to be adjusted annually)
P&F>5% of the loan principal for loans >=$40,000; or 6% of the loan principal for loans <=$40,000
Like HOEPA
Points and fees definition
It includes, among others, all compensation paid directly or indirectly to a mortgage broker (includes YSPs); premiums for credit life, credit accident, credit health, loss of income, debt cancellation etc.; the maximum prepayment penalties which may be charged or collected under the terms of the loan document; all prepayment fees or penalties that are charged if the loan refinances a previous loan made or currently held by the same creditor of its affiliate. Excludable: 2 BFDs if loan rate is within 1% of 90-day Fannie/Freddie rate.
It includes, among others, all compensation paid directly or indirectly to a mortgage broker; premiums for credit life, credit disability, credit unemployment, or any other live or health insurance that is financed directly or indirectly into the loan.
It includes, among others, all compensation paid directly or indirectly to a mortgage broker. Excludable: BFDs; up to 1.5 points in indirect broker compensation, if the terms of the loan do not include PP>2% of the home loan principal; reasonable fees paid to an affiliate of the creditor.
Not mentioned or found in the bill Georgia Illinois Indiana Kentucky Prepayment penalties No prepayment penalties after the last day of the 24th month following the loan closing or at any time if prepayment penalties exceed in the aggregate: (1) during the first 12 months, more than 2% of the loan amount prepaid, or (2) during the second 12 months, more than 1% of the loan amount prepaid.
No prepayment penalties after the first 36 months. Prepayment penalty cannot exceed 3% of the total loan amount if the prepayment is made within the first 12 months; 2% within the second 12 months; and 1% within the third 12 months.
Prohibits prepayment penalty exceeding 2% of the HCL amount prepaid during the first 24 months after closing. No prepayment penalty after the 2nd year. No prepayment penalty without an option of choosing a loan product without a prepayment penalty (must include "loan product choice" disclosure)
Prepayment penalty prohibited if charged more than 36 months after the loan closing or which exceeds 3% of the amount prepaid during the first year, 2% during the second year, and 1% during the third year.
Loan counseling Required. Lender must receive a certification that borrower received counseling, and special disclosure notice must be provided to borrower.
Prohibits lending without a counseling notice and disclosure. Prohibits selling of single premium credit insurance without also offering its sale on a monthly basis.
Prohibits the financing of single premium credit insurance. Also, the lender cannot require a borrower to purchase property insurance coverage against risk to any improvement in an amount exceeding the replacement value of improvements.
Prohibits financing of single premium credit insurance (applies to a home mortgage loan). P&F > 4.5% of the total loan amount for loans =/> $40,000, the lesser of 6% of the total loan amount or $1,000 for loans <$20,000, and 6% of the total loan amount for loans =/>$20,000 but <$40,000 P&F > 5% of the principal loan amount for loans =/> $20,000; the lesser of $1,000 or 8% of the principal loan amount for loans < $20,000 P&F > 5% of total loan amount for loans in the amount of $50,000 or more; 6% of total loan amount for loans in the amount of $50,000 that are purchase-money loans guaranteed by FHA or VA; or the greater of 6% of total loan amount or $1,500 for loans up to $50,000.
P&F> 5% of total loan amount if loan =/> $20,000; or lesser of 8% of total loan amount of $1,000 if loan < $20,000. Certain items may be excluded from the calculation of P&F. Prohibits selling of single premium credit insurance, unless insurance on a monthly basis is also offered and the borrower is provided a special notice.
Prohibits selling of single premium credit insurance, unless insurance on a monthly basis is also offered and the borrower is provided a special notice.
Prohibits financing of single premium credit insurance (applies to consumer home loans) 
